During collectivization, Baptists were accused of resisting grain seizures; 13 by 1937 they were charged with counter-revolutionary agitation. 14 A lull of sorts occurred in the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, but when propaganda campaigns were revived post-Stalin, even more sustained attention was paid to the "sectarian,"
as Klibanov's figures show.
Why were "sectarians" awarded such attention? Several reasons present themselves. First, as the work of Alexander Etkind demonstrates, the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, officialdom, and the Russian Orthodox Church expressed a fascination with the "exotic" behavior of the "sectarians"
and this already provided their Soviet heirs with a rich repertoire of ideas about the strange and disturbing rituals nonconformist groups might practice. 15 Second, the "sectarian" could be easily identified as foreign: the original transmission of ideas from Protestant Germany aided accusations of collaboration during the Nazi occupation; 16 and the huge Baptist and Pentecostal congregations in the USA allowed Protestantism to be disparaged as the "American faith,"
particularly during the Cold War. 17 Third, in the 1950s increasing numbers of Pentecostals, including Fedotov, began to organize regular worship outside of the registered congregations; in the early 1960s, some Evangelical Christians-Baptists, critical of outside intervention in congregational life, formed the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists. 18 These splinter groups allowed the loyalty of the whole Protestant church to be questioned.
At first glance the return to aggressive measures against religious communities under
Khrushchev might seem to run contrary to the spirit of de-Stalinization, in particular the promise to respect "socialist legality." Recent work, however, shows how the renewal of the atheist Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. crusade complemented other dimensions of de-Stalinization, especially the revival of the revolutionary spirit and the renewed quest to build communism (in which, of course, religion had no place). As Andrew Stone argues, the attempt to overcome "peasant backwardness" -including religious belief -was in keeping with the modernizing agenda of the era more generally. 19 Other recent scholarship emphasizes how the Soviet space program was used to encourage a secular worldview. 20 Without disputing the clear link between atheist campaigning and the modernising ethos of the era, I suggest that the fixation with the fiendish, disturbing, "other" reflects a different side to the campaigns, and therefore to de-Stalinization.
In this time of political and social upheaval, there was a need to consolidate Soviet values;
identifying and castigating transgressors was one way to do so. 21 
Stories of Protestants' ritual
violence were used to promote a dichotomy between the atheist, decent, and Soviet community on the one hand, and the religious, depraved and "American" community of Pentecostals and
Baptists on the other. Descriptions of believers' excessive emotions (uncontrolled dancing, crying, and moaning) established a comparison between their hysterical, strange, and "savage"
(dikii) behavior and the rational and disciplined habits of the Soviet world. 22 In depicting the monstrous behavior of the evangelical "other" the press aimed to produce passionate responses from their reader. 23 The impetus behind these anti-sectarian initiatives came from various quarters. By the second half of the 1950s, state officials worried that the return of believers from the Gulag were revitalizing unregistered religious groups. At the same time, journalists and editors enjoyed the additional room for maneuver. With some of the strictures of the Stalinist period lifted, and with a new pressure to raise their circulation figures, newspaper editors sought to make their Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. publications more lively and engaging; stories of the bizarre, violent, and strange behavior of the "sectarian" proved enticing material. 24 Journalists did not abandon their long-established role as "educators," however, and some were instrumental in nudging the party leadership towards more stringent measures against believers. 25 A combination of such interests led to the first case to be investigated in this article, which itself influenced later campaigns. Reactions to such stories, discussed in the second half of the article, suggest that they resonated in the public imagination.
The campaigns seemed to validate the expression of intense animosity against those who, by nature of their religious beliefs and life choices, were identified as different. This was, of course, the intention of the campaign, but by admitting the presence of the uncivilized and untamed within Soviet society, the regime risked generating fears which might themselves prove disorderly. Harassment of religious communities never ceased, but from 1964 Moscow tried to rein in some of the more extreme formulations.
Through examination of two case-studies, this article will suggest key reasons why the campaigns, in their most sensational form, were curbed even before Khrushchev's ouster from power and despite the regime's ongoing commitment to inculcating atheism. First, if religion was established as the irrational, hysterical antithesis to rational, Soviet modernity, it inevitably generated notions of the believer as mad. How then should a society which was trying to reinvent itself as humanitarian and law-bound, deal with such people? Could the "mad" be punished? Second, the sensationalist formulations rendered voluntary atheist work with believers problematic. If the "sectarian" was such a monstrous figure, could she really be reasoned with?
Could citizens be mobilized for such risky work? Third, the campaigns had the potential to run out of control, with Soviet citizens themselves identifying targets and demanding punishment.
Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. By focusing on children, the press hit a raw nerve, for many citizens seem to have had existing concerns about their own offspring's welfare and safety. In this anxious context, the distinctive family values of Protestants, who often had large numbers of children, made them easily identifiable as "other" and ready targets for scape-goating. As the second case shows, anger and hostility could escalate exponentially, here directed toward a mother who -despite her large brood -apparently perverted maternal values. In both cases examined the "killer" was a woman.
As we shall see, media accounts also charged men with involvement in bloody rituals but they were invariably church ministers: in contrast, the lay-person who got swept away by her religious fervor to commit violence against a child seems more likely to be a woman, perhaps reflecting entrenched notions of the female as a disturbing presence. 26 In terms of the chronology of the anti-religious campaigns, the established literature identifies a four-month operation from July to November 1954 and a second more sustained initiative from 1958/9 to 1964. 27 The years 1955-1957 have been defined by one historian as the "most liberal years for religious believers since 1947." 28 This article explores cases which fall on either side of the campaign's peak: the death of Kolia in 1955 and that of another young child, "Viktor", in the city of Mtsensk in Orel oblast in 1966. As such, they allow insight into the inception and aftermath of the anti-religious crusade and suggest that neither the beginning nor the end were clear-cut. Whilst the main wave of propaganda materials can indeed be dated to the end of the decade, anti-sectarian sallies were possible in the mid-1950s and, as argued here, might even offer the template for the later, more sustained campaigns. And once the ball had been set in motion, it was hard to stop: journalists, local officials, and ordinary citizens continued to find the Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. to crucify the young heroine Ol'ga. 32 Here we see a clear transmission from the prerevolutionary literature on "sects" whose practices allegedly included ritual imitations of Christ's crucifixion. 33 The Soviet addition was that Ol'ga was to be actually sacrificed, had she not been saved just in time. Komsomol'skaia pravda had run a similar story just a few years earlier. 34 Medicalized language was common in the press, again sometimes a direct echo of terms used in discussion of the khlysty and other mystical Christian sects before 1917. 35 In one press piece, the reader learnt of the Pentecostals' "convulsive arm movements," spasms, and contagiousness, terms common in earlier anti-sectarian texts.
36
Other press materials told of believers' descent into mental illness requiring extended psychiatric treatment.
37
Although the pre-revolutionary era provided a rich set of images and ideas about both the sickness and violence of the "sectarian," it seems to be in the Soviet era -and specifically under Khrushchev -that cruelty towards children became a regular feature of anti-sectarian tracts.
October 1960, Izvestiia reported on the killing of a three-year old boy in Krasnodar region: in the midst of worship, a "prophetess" cried out "in a hysterical voice" that only by sacrificing the blood of a "lamb" could their sins be washed away; the pastor wrenched a boy from his mother's arms and killed him.
39
Even when articles covered less serious religious "offenses," they frequently began with references to other (unrelated) violent crimes allegedly carried out by "sectarians," such as the suffocation and beheading of children. In 1961, for example, the Saratov local newspaper printed an article about Pentecostal preachers who discouraged their followers from consulting doctors and tried to convert young people but it began by detailing three more sensational cases: an eight-year-old had almost been suffocated by believers in Ukraine; a female sectarian had chopped the head off her daughter in a bout of religious fanaticism; and a man had tried to crucify his wife. 40 But importantly, the accusation of sacrificial child-killing became fundamental to the most high-profile case against Pentecostals in this period: the arrest and trial of Ivan Fedotov. 41 His arrest was granted significant media coverage: in addition to the book of images described above, his case was also covered in Izvestiia and Literaturnaia gazeta, and a newsreel of the trial regularly screened. 42 Why did child sacrifice make its appearance now? In part it reflects broader concerns about the raising of healthy Soviet children in these years. Susan Reid argues that the 1950s saw a "reinvigoration […] of the ideology of childhood" and that the notion of the happy Soviet childhood became central to the Khrushchev regime's legitimacy. 43 The alternative upbringing which Christian families offered became intolerable for the authorities; as Olena Panych comments, with reference to Evangelical Christian-Baptist families, children were "at the center of a political struggle." 44 In the press, many articles were devoted to the way children were
Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. damaged, physically and psychologically, by a religious upbringing, one piece referring to children "whose childhood has been taken away from them." 45 But the specter of the child-killer took matters a step further. I argue here that the notion of the sectarian child-killer had its roots in a very specific case: the death of Kolia, apparently killed by his grandmother, Praskov'ia. in
1955.
Invariably press articles on Fedotov in 1960-61 made reference to this earlier crime. 46 In the three-quarter-page spread devoted to his trial in Literaturnaia gazeta, a significant portion of the text was about Praskov'ia, not only because she was mother to one of the women on trial, but because she provided the story with real horror: Fedotov's "victim" could be seen playing happily in a photograph at the top of the page, while allusion to Kolia's death five years earlier gave her escape story a sinister twist.
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Praskov'ia's tragic story thus led not only to her own execution but also to her demonization in the antireligious campaigns which followed. 48 For this reason, her case warrants closer inspection.
Kolia's death first came to public attention in June 1956 under the stark newspaper headline "fanatics" (izuvery). 49 The authors were A. Bezuglov, who held a position at the Procuracy, and V. Perel'man, a young journalist. Friends since their days as law students, the two had published their first joint article just two weeks earlier, a piece about a woman who had killed a hated daughter-in-law and her three-year-old child. 50 Bezuglov possibly knew of Praskov'ia's crime from his work for the criminal justice system, whilst Perel'man was keen to make it as a journalist and soon became a regular contributor to Trud, the trade union newspaper aimed at workers and characterized by light stories.
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For Perel'man and his friends, at least, the first article was a real "sensation" (sensatsiia) and Perel'man later admitted that at this time he sought
Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. to write only articles which would "strike a spark in the soul of the reader" and incite their "anger and sarcasm" (gnev i sarkazm). 52 Kolia's story fitted the bill. Father, who created heaven and earth, has done for you. In order that he saves you, I will send Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. The article simply accelerated the narrative: the son and daughter fell asleep briefly during the night but Praskov'ia woke them at dawn and wrapped them in white sheets; naked, the three prayed hysterically for three days. No one saw, or at least admitted to seeing, Praskov'ia kill her grandson Kolia with a two-meter plank or beat his brother Dima half-to-death. 56 The killing of Kolia took place almost a year and a half before it was reported in the press. In that time, Praskov'ia wrote at least two petitions in which she pleaded for clemency, without denying the killing. The first letter, addressed to the Supreme Court in January 1956, was largely written in the passive form, conveying a sense of Praskov'ia's failure to control events: "Kirov oblast court punished me severely as if I had done it deliberately. But churches in the village and that I had the Gospels. But this didn't make any difference to my life.
There's nothing about me that would make me give a child to God as a sacrifice." 59 The handwriting and broken syntax make Praskov'ia's letters hard to follow, both for the present-day researcher and for officials at the time. 60 All the same, her letters suggest an alternative reading to the one provided in Trud on at least two matters: her mental health and her faith.
Her claim to have suffered some kind of mental breakdown was corroborated by the doctors who first treated her. According to psychiatrists at the Litvinov Psycho-Neurological Hospital in
Kalinin she had a "primitive personality" (primitivnaia lichnost') and at the moment of committing the crime was in a hallucinatory and hysterical state. In their assessment, she was not legally accountable (nevmeniaemaia), her mental disorder so deep that she could not give a clear account of her own actions or control them. 61 However, opposition to the Kalinin diagnosis -its origins unclear from the available records -led to Praskov'ia being moved to the Serbskii Institute in Moscow where she spent almost five months. Specialists at the hospital -later infamous for its maltreatment of dissidents -now declared her fit to stand trial. 62 The possibility of a diagnosed psychological condition was entirely absent from the Trud article: it painted her as a fanatic, but did not even raise the possibility that mental illness might explain her actions. to murder the two boys, not her unorthodox religious ideas. Indeed in summing up the court denounced the killing as a crime against the family, stressing the fact that Praskov'ia had "a duty
Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. Following hearings in January and May (at which this punishment was upheld), the Russian Supreme Court wrote a summary of the case in June 1956 which shows how interpretations of the crime had evolved since the hearing in Kalinin the previous December. Now, as concerns about Pentecostal activity grew, it was presented not so much as a crime against the sanctity of the family, but as a religious offense. The report gave a long description of the prayer session which preceded the killing. "Standing in front of them," it claimed, "[Praskov'ia] acted like some kind of holy person, summonsed up 'God's son' and announced to all attending that she had a 'vision,' and that her daughter had come to believe in God, and that her son-in-law Fedor was also moving towards the faith." That same evening, it continued, she baptized her daughter in the new faith, putting her fingers into her mouth "to chase the devil" away.
It is not, of course, impossible for someone to admit to a crime she did not commit, but if we are to believe her petitions, Praskov'ia did end the life of her own grandson. Significantly, this tragedy happened for reasons very different from the ones presented by the Supreme Court, or by
Bezuglov and Perel'man. Over the long months between the murder and the final stage in the legal process, the case was transformed in two important ways: Praskov'ia was turned into a committed and fanatical Pentecostal and the medical diagnosis of insanity was quashed, although the press coverage gave readers little doubt about her dangerous depravity.
The publication of the Trud article did not come at the height of the press campaigns but it set the template for subsequent coverage. 64 It also embodied some of the contradictions inherent in he preached sobriety, warned against hooliganism, and championed the importance of Soviet, rather than capitalist, morality, themes echoed here. 66 ) The result is problematic: the blend of sensationalism on the one hand, and calls for renewed atheist work on the other make it a difficult text. Readers were urged to enter into instructive dialogue with Christians, but the kind of long-term, patient work this required was surely difficult to reconcile with the passions unleashed by the article's depiction of such an alien, incomprehensible, and violent world.
Baptists and Samosud
Although the waning of the anti-religious campaign is normally associated with Khrushchev's ouster from power in October 1964, the shift began some months earlier. 67 Following a Central
Committee Plenum at the end of the previous year, the January 1964 editions of Nauka i religiia Behind the scenes, a new approach to religion stressing the importance of legality emerged at least as early as June 1964, with local officials discouraged from employing the extra-legal measures that had been common over the past decade. 69 The atheist crusade was increasingly at odds with Khrushchev's own much-vaunted promises to observe legality (zakonnost') and with regard to the Protestant communities at least, it was proving counter-productive: some outspoken believers were challenging the restrictions placed on religious worship and openly criticizing the leadership of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (AUCECB) for agreeing to implement policies they considered detrimental to spiritual life.
70
One of the most striking features of the discussions taking place in 1964-5 is the repeated criticism of the press for its portrayal of the "sectarian. 73 These comments were part of a wider attack on the press which began in 1965. Concerned about a surfeit of salacious stories, the party leadership began to criticize newspapers for printing "sensationalist" material. 74 The kind of human interest stories which Perel'man had so relished -in which people had often behaved in a violent, scandalous, or immoral fashion -became less common.
As senior officials tried to implement the new importance attached to observing legality, they faced an additional challenge from the newly formed Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (CCECB) which protested against outside intervention in congregational life.
In the first few months of 1966 press materials criticized members of the CCECB for flouting Soviet legislation on where and when worship could take place, but the techniques used to stigmatize "sectarians" in the Khrushchev-era were not revived. 75 As our second case study will demonstrate, however, the sinister specter of the sectarian child-killer had not disappeared from Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. "this is in the place of a future pioneer tie." The report identified Natasha as being a member of the CCECB because, in searching her home, a copy of the "Appeal to Mothers" and the samizdat magazine Bratskii listok had been discovered; the family motorcycle was cited as evidence that she acted as courier between different underground groups. The report may have been in reaction to a recent CARC circular warning its officials about the activities of the Council of Churches, but the author was also clearly alarmed by local reactions to the killing. 78 Vysotskii noted that many people were demanding the death penalty, and reported that on the day of the funeral (25 May), almost "the entire town" accompanied the coffin and body. "The police were forced to take measures in order to prevent reprisals, or samosud, against R.'s home," he wrote. Vysotskii also suggested that the boy's mother (assumed at this stage to be a fellow "sectarian") knew about the murder plans, and that "typically" she and the boy's father, as believers, were unmoved by the tragedy. Several of the claims made in this first report turned out to be false, or
Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. With time, the authorities would discover more about Natasha's life. Born in 1934 in a village in Tula oblast, she had seven years schooling before moving to Mtsensk where she worked as a seamstress. By her thirties, Natasha had given up work and given birth to seven children, for which she had received an award for motherhood. 80 Unlike Praskov'ia, Natasha had the support of well-educated family members who wrote petitions on her behalf. 81 Her uncle composed two long letters, in which he portrayed himself and his family as reasonable, Soviet citizens and Natasha as a misguided, but essentially decent, woman. 82 According to his petitions, Natasha was drawn to the Baptists as a result of the materially difficult life she led in Mtsensk: the family of nine was living off her husband's salary of 80 roubles and the family cow; her husband spent the last of their money on the motorcycle; and he beat her for refusing abortions on religious grounds. When, in the spring of 1966, her son "Volodia" was accepted into the pioneers the situation reached crisis-point, although, the uncle insisted, Natasha had not opposed his joining. 83 Because of the family's limited living space, Volodia often stayed with extended family, but in
April an argument between Natasha and a relative -also a Baptist -led to the boy returning home, and in the move, his pioneer tie being lost. "This argument," wrote the uncle, "arose NOT on religious grounds -entirely the investigator's invention -but because of manure which had been set aside for fertilizing their garden plots." 84 But as Natasha was a known believer, the school took Volodia's lost pioneer tie as a sign of protest. She was summonsed before the parents' committee, harangued for three hours, and threatened with the removal of her children.
Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. This was no empty threat: during the early 1960s a number of Baptists who ran into conflict with the regime had their children taken away and the pressure exerted on families was enormous. 85 In her uncle's view, these events led to Natasha's mental breakdown. When Volodia brought a letter home from school for his father, Natasha only glanced at it briefly before concluding that a reference to "two forms" (which in fact related to the children's trip to summer camp) was evidence that the process of removing her children had begun. According to several witnesses, the uncle said, she now began to behave "like a madwoman." Frenzied, she repeatedly asked her neighbor (the mother of the murdered boy) for "TWO FORMS." identified a "psychopathic character" (psikhopaticheskaia lichnost') but she was conscious of her actions and therefore accountable for them (vmeniaemaia). 88 Seemingly inexplicable deedssuch as giving away the family cow -were interpreted not as evidence of madness, but of religious conspiracy: the cow was a gift to lure her neighbor into the sect. 89 In addition to the uncle's efforts, two lawyers wrote in defense of Natasha, downplaying her religiosity (noting that she was not even a full member of a Baptist congregation) and, like the uncle, arguing that there were clear signs of insanity.
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The family's campaign seems to have worked, at least in part: the Russian Supreme Court reviewed the case for a second time on 3 November 1966 and, although Natasha was still considered accountable for her actions, she was reprieved from the death penalty and instead sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.
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Some Mtsensk residents were surely disappointed, their anger against the "sectarians" already in full throttle. In the days immediately following the killing, groups of concerned citizens gathered, gossiped, and debated the case, often calling for the death penalty to be awarded. 92 Some of these meetings had an official feeling, and brief, formal, minutes [protokoly] were produced; others appear more impromptu. Collective letters were dispatched to local and national courts, as well as to the editors of the regional newspaper, Orlovskaia pravda. Inserted into Natasha's legal dossier, these unpublished texts show that local inhabitants had come to fear the existence of a conspiracy: this single killing had far wider, and disturbing, implications than first apparent, they claimed.
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On 25 May, at a meeting held at the school attended by Natasha's children, 45 people signed a "resolution" which demanded the death penalty and -in language redolent of the Stalinist eradeplored "the crime of an enemy of the people who chose the sabotage route" (prestuplenie 94 She had not acted alone, the letter-writers alleged, pointing the finger at the "baptist-schismatics" (baptisty-raskol'niki) and demanding the liquidation of the sect.
On 27 May a group of thirty-five female workers from the Mtsensk Aluminium Casting Factory wrote a collective letter in which they lamented the fact that a "terrorist act" had happened in their own town. As at the meeting two days earlier, they saw a conspiracy, writing: "How long will a small band of sectarian-throatcutters poison our life? How long will bloodthirsty 'brothers and sisters in Christ' celebrate the end of their fasts by feasting on our children?" 95 Whilst the influence of pre-revolutionary ideas about Christian sects had played a part in the way Soviet officials viewed Pentecostal practices, here we can detect other influences: the accusation of throat-cutting, fasts, and feasting, and the ritualistic drinking of blood are all reminiscent of the Jewish blood libel. 96 These additions suggest that whilst anti-sectarian sentiment had been encouraged by the campaigns of the Khrushchev era, its populist articulation may have drawn on, and adapted, existing anti-semitic traditions.
In a similar fashion, concerns about protecting "Soviet" childhood largely reflected the emphasis of the Khrushchev-era atheist campaigns, but also acquired new nuances. In their collective letters, anxieties about child welfare related in particular to the practical issue of ensuring children were adequately supervised. Women from the Mtsensk Aluminium Casting Factory seemed to worry that whilst they were at work their children were in danger: "How long will we fear for our children so that at lunchtime we run home with the single thought: 'is our son alive'?" 97 Such concerns are understandable: child-care had become more available in the postStalin years, but the provision was not universal and not always satisfactory, particularly outside Viktor on the day of the murder was one of the disputed aspects of the case: although the (unpublished) court verdict, as well as the uncle's testimony, implied that his mother left Viktor in Natasha's care, the account published in Orlovskaia pravda said the three-year-old was left playing alone in the courtyard (dvor). Outraged people threw stones at the parents, even though they only knew about the circumstances and causes of the death from rumors. 106 The women appear to have mixed feelings: they are implicitly critical of the stone-throwers who acted aggressively without knowing the whole story, but are themselves incensed by the idea of funeral rituals carried out "their own way." 107 They resented that "sectarian" families raised their children in a different, non-Soviet manner, with their own "laws and commandments." 108 Large
Baptist and Pentecostal broods -in contrast to the wider trend for reduced family size in these years -were an unmistakable sign of the different life-choices some Soviet citizens were making. 109 Whether the fact that Natasha, as mother of seven, had previously been decorated for her child-bearing services played a part in this escalation of public rage is difficult to gauge, but certainly some women were angered that she bore the "title" (zvanie) of mother. One letter, Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. When, more than a week after the murder, the Soviet press at last intervened to offer an official interpretation, the Izvestiia journalist presented his article as a response to the public outcry witnessed in Mtsensk.
112
Repeatedly criticizing the local authorities' failure to carry out "explanatory work" in the town, the journalist, N. Shtan'ko, noted the "fantastical conjectures,"
"monstrous versions of this tragic story," and rumors about "sectarian terror" which were circulating. The police had allegedly been required to stand guard over Natasha's home to prevent enraged citizens destroying it, as well as providing protection to Mtsensk's "sectarians"
against "elemental anger" (stikhiinyi gnev). In using the term "elemental anger" the Izvestiia journalist implied that citizens' rage, although it had been fed by atheist propaganda in recent years, was not the mature, Soviet response required. 113 The article was thus, at least in some respects, in keeping with the dictates of the new more restrained approach whereby believers were to be condemned for breaking laws, not simply vilified. Indeed, once he had identified Natasha as part of the CCECB, Shtan'ko used the case to condemn the movement's leaders for "refusing to recognize the laws of the Soviet state."
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Yet Shtan'ko, who built his career on being a journalist responding to popular concerns, and who had written positively about "people's anger" towards sectarians five years earlier, did not entirely dismiss the conspiracy ordinary people suspected.
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" [People] saw that the tragedy happened as a result of religion, they knew that the killing was accompanied by actions reminiscent of some kind of ritual," wrote Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. of mental disturbance, he argued, she was not deserving of much empathy, given that it was her beliefs that had made her unwell in the first place.
Having embraced sensationalism in its treatment of "sectarians" under Khrushchev, the press now tried half-heartedly to rein in the more extreme responses. But, both before and after the media's intervention, passions ran high in Mtsensk. As they composed collective texts, citizens described their emotions -fear, horror, alarm, anger, and indignation. The sense of community articulated by crowds who met to observe the funeral, to threaten Natasha's home, or to write letters, appears brittle: on the one hand, citizens expressed pride in Soviet childhood, motherhood and the nation's progress towards a better future; on the other they were anxious, quick to extrapolate from one murder to a wave of terror and ritual killings, and indignant that the state did not do more to ensure their children's welfare.
*
During the unsettled years of de-Stalinization, Soviet identity was in flux: pride in the past was marred by Stalin's discrediting, the status of erstwhile heroes (and enemies) now in question. In the climate of the Cold War, it was imperative to reaffirm a narrative of progress: Soviet culture was modern, secular, and civilized -and infinitely superior to the benighted values of the West.
Anti-religious campaigns were central to this re-shaping and re-launching of Soviet patriotism;
their emphasis on atheism's scientific foundations was intrinsically linked with the Soviet claim to represent modernity on the world stage.
The campaigns of the late 1950s and early 1960s also had another side, however, for they were reliant on depicting the uncivilized "other." Soviet citizens were urged to rally against the Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. regime's attempt to re-invent itself as a government concerned with humanitarianism and the observance of due legal process. Whilst the notional believer could be represented as depraved and deranged in the press, when it came to real-life cases like those of Praskov'ia and Natasha, there were those -relatives, doctors, lawyers -who believed that mental illness prohibited sentencing.
The press attacks on "sectarians" had encouraged emotional responses, suggesting they resonated with existing animosities towards communities whose religious practices were strange, and whose moral codes -particularly governing family size -marked them out as "other." Outbreaks of hostility were often sparked by local incidents. 117 In Mtsensk men and, in particular, women took to the streets and meeting-halls in the wake of a tragedy that had happened within their city, to articulate anxieties about the safety and well-being of their children. These fears had been stoked by a decade of press campaigns which insisted on the uncontrolled violence of "sectarians" like Natasha. Yet the crowd's violence was itself alarming, requiring police presence on the city streets to prevent escalation.
If the anti-religious crusade was intended to establish a community of atheists who were enlightened, resolute, and rational, then the disturbing specter of the child-killer was counterproductive for it served to generate disorderly emotions. Moscow tried to curb the campaign's Author Posting. © 2014 The Russian Review. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of the copyright holder for personal use, not for redistribution. 
